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CASE COMMENTS
Whether we call it "proximate cause", "contributed proxi-
mately", or "substantial factor", it becomes largely a battle of words.
What is needed is a separation between the issue of cause and the
multitude of other issues. 60 YALE, L.J. 761 (1951). This might not
alter a single verdict, but it could not help but lighten the burden now
placed upon the jury to apply the law which is rightly the duty of the
court. Whatever the answer, if there is one, at least for the present it
does not appear that the West Virginia court has made any drastic
alteration in their definition of proximate cause.
Robert William Burk, Jr.
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit-Lack of
Jurisdiction vs. Mistake of Law
P was granted an absolute divorce in the State of Florida. The
decree included a provision that in the event H, P's former husband,
should predecease P, the monthly alimony would become a charge
upon his estate during her lifetime. H died while a resident of West
Virginia. P brings this action against the heirs and administrator of H
for the alimony unpaid since his death. The trial court ruled that the
Florida court was without jurisdiction to award alimony against H
which would be valid and enforceable against his estate after his
death, and therefore, such judgment was not entitled to ful faith and
credit in the courts of this state. Held, affirmed. A court in this state
may inquire into the proper jurisdiction of the court of another state.
The lack of proper jurisdiction in the court of another state will render
the judgment or decree of such state void and incapable of enforce-
ment in a court of this state. Such void judgment is a nullity and may
be attacked directly or collaterally in any court where that judgment
is sought to be enforced. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 127 S.E.2d 385 (W.
Va. 1962).
The principal case revolves on the question of whether the
Florida court actually had jurisdiction to grant the decree in question,
whether they may have exceeded their jurisdiction, or whether theirs
was a mistake of law in exercising proper jurisdiction. If the error
was merely a mistake of law, the issues are res judicata and the full
faith and credit clause would apply. If the error is lack of jurisdic-
tion or the exceeding of jurisdiction in granting the decree in question,
the decree may be collaterally attacked as a void decree. The dif-
ference is often quite difficult to preceive. In fact, the difference
between the concept of jurisdiction alone is often confused with the
improper or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by a court.
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Article IV, section 1 of the United State Constitution, the full
faith and credit clause, provides that the courts of a state must give the
judgment of a sister state the same effect and validity that it would
receive in the jurisdiction in which it was rendered. This clause
establishes a useful means of ending litigation between adverse
parties. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1941). In its
essential aspects, the clause compels that controversies be settled, to
the end that when a particular jurisdiction has before it the parties
and control of the subject matter, "its judgment controls in other
states to the same extent as it does in the state where rendered."
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); Riley v. New York Trust
Co., supra; 64 W. VA. L. REv. 427 (1962). The successful cause
of action which is merged into the judgment is discharged thereby.
Thereafter, the judgment, whether considered as a debt or an
obligation, is specifically protected and may not be contested save on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942); Adams v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). The
above principle is recognized in numerous West Virginia cases and is
cited in both the majority and minority opinions of the court in the
principal case. Gavenda Bros. v. Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va.
732, 116 S.E.2d 910 (1960); Gardner v. Gardner, 144 W. Va. 630,
110 S.E.2d 495 (1959).
The basis upon which the principal case refuses to give full
faith and credit to the decree of the Florida court is that since
no agreement existed between the parties relating to the payment of
alimony past the death of the husband, the Florida court did not have
jurisdiction to award such alimony and therefore the decree was void
to that extent. Florida law relative to such decrees has only recently
begun to crystalize. In Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So.2d 281
(Fla. 1953), the Florida court declared that alimony is limited to
the lifetime of the husband because of its very nature. In that
case the court was considering the validity of a divorce decree
which incorporated an agreement between the husband and wife
whereby the husband agreed to pay a specified sum to the wife as long
as she lived. The court said that "the legal effect of such payments
are that they constitute property settlements and not alimony." The
next important case on this same principle was Johnson v. Every,
93 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1957). Here the court continued the distinction
established in the Underwood case in referring to the divorce decree
which "embodied" the property settlement agreement. There the court
stated that "where the divorce decree or property settlement agree-
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ment" provided for continued payments until the death of the wife,
the estate of the husband would remain liable as for any other valid
obligation. (Emphasis added.) The disjunctive form used would
seem to indicate that the divorce decree could embody a provision for
the payment to the wife until her death without the necessity of a
previous written agreement. However, this position becomes very
vague, if not indeed untenable, in the light of a more recent decision
by the District Court of Appeals of Florida in Deigaard v. Deigaard,
114 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1959). In this cast the court recognized the
previous decisions relating to a divorced husband's liability for ali-
mony generally terminating with his death. This case related to a
divorce decree which provided for periodic payments of alimony
and in addition a lump sum payment in lieu of post-demise alimony.
The only statutory provision relative to alimony in Florida is as
follows: "In any award of permanent alimony the court shall have
jurisdiction to order periodic payments or payment in a lump sum."
The court pointed out that a chancellor could not award periodic
alimony payments as well as lump sum payments in the same decree
and then held that, in the absence of an expressed contract or
agreement between the parties, a decree ordering alimony which would
continue beyond the life of the husband was without legal basis.
Thus, the distinction drawn between alimony and property settlement
in the previous cases seemed to be abandoned or ignored.
The decree of the Florida court in the principal case held that D
was ordered to pay to P a specific sum "for her permanent alimony"
and in the event D should predecease P the monthly sum would be-
come "a charge upon his estate during her lifetime." If a great deal of
imagination is employed, it might be suggested that from the language
used by the decree the Florida court had intended to continue the dis-
tinction drawn by the earlier Florida cases between the monthly "ali-
mony" payable to P and the monthly "sum" which would exist after
the death of D ,but such a suggestion is highly speculative.
The majority opinion admits that the Florida court had jurisdic-
tion of the parties and of the subject matter in the principal case.
The minority opinion contends that in view of these facts the error
of the Florida court was one of law and not of jurisdiction and
therefore not reviewable in a collateral proceeding. It has been
held that a judgment entered by a court which has jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the parties would be merely erroneous
rather than void. Pruett v. Pruett's Adm'x, 301 Ky. 568, 192 S.W.2d
722 (1946). Further, the Supreme Court, in Swift & Co. v. United
1962 ]
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States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928), held that where a court has jurisdiction
over the person and subject matter, no error in the exercise of such
jurisdiction can make the judgment void. A necessary integral of
the full faith and credit clause is the fact that a foreign judgment
will not be impeached because of a mistake of fact or an error of
law. Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927). The mere fact
that the prior judgment was erroneous is immaterial. The remedy
for such error is by way of direct appeal, not collateral attack.
Chandler v. Pekety, 297 U.S. 609 (1936). Finally, the West Virginia
Supreme Court, in Gaymont Fuel Co. v. Price, 135 W. Va. 785, 65
S.E.2d 393 (1951), held that where a court has jurisdiction, it has a
right to decide other questions arising in a cause and whether the
decision is correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is binding
in every other court.
Under the above principles a good argument could be raised that,
since the Florida court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject matter, the decree was merely a mistake of law. In the
light of Gaymont Fuel Co. v. Price, supra, the court had jurisdiction
and the extent of its inquiry as to alimony and a property settlement
was one of the questions necessarily arising from the cause.
On the other hand, it has also been held that if a court exceeds
its jurisdiction in rendering a particular judgment such judgment is
subject to collateral attack, even though the court had jurisdiction
of the parties and of the subject matter. West End Irrigation Co. v.
Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476 (1947). A judgment entered
by a court which transcends the limits of its authority is void.
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943). It
is also contended by the majority that even though the Florida court
had jurisdiction of the parties to begin with, it acted in excess of
that jurisdiction in the decree which it granted. Excess of jurisdic-
tion as distinguished from lack of jurisdiction means that an act, even
though within the general power of the court, is void because the
conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the particular
power of a court are lacking. Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268, 57
So. 860 (1912). Thus, the key could be the lack of the agreement
between the parties as to alimony (or any payments) to exist beyond
the life of the husband as contemplated in Diegaard v. Diegaard,
supra. The Florida court had jurisdiction to grant the divorce and
alimony, but in granting the particular type of payments in the princi-
pal case without an expressed agreement to that effect, acted in excess
of its jurisdiction.
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A case somewhat analogous to the principal case was that of
Gardner v. Gardner, supra. In that case a divorce was obtained in
Tennessee through the perpetration of a fraud on the court by P. In
the unaminous opinion, the court pointed out that this is clearly an
instance where the full faith and credit clause does not apply to
the decree of a sister state. The court in Tennessee had no jurisdiction
over the parties because of the fraud and this would have been a valid
defense to an appeal of the decision in a Tennessee court. This case
illustrates a more readily available application of the jurisdiction test
in order to validly refuse to grant full faith and credit to the judgment
of a sister state.
A further point in the principal case meriting discussion, brought
out by the dissenting opinion, is with regard to the doctrine of res
judicata and the appearance of D in the Florida court. The doctrine of
res judicata prevents a cause of action which has once been fairly
litigated from ever being relitigated by the same parties or their privies.
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Williamson v.
Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 185 F.2d 464 (3rd Cir. 1950);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 48 (1942). Assuming that the parties
to a litigation are before the court, as they were in the principal case,
the question arises as to whether jurisdictional issues become res
judicata if they were not, but might have been, litigated. If this
question can be answered in the affirmative, the very basis upon which
the West Virginia Supreme Court decided the principal case should
have been a moot question. The Restatement of Judgments declares
that res judicata is applicable not only where the question of the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter was actually litigated,
but also it was not so litigated, the court and the parties assuming that
it had jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10, comment c
(1942). The Supreme Court has held that the principle of res judicata
may be pleaded as a bar, not only as respects matters actually pre-
sented to sustain or defeat the right asserted in the earlier proceeding,
but also as respects any other available matters which might have been
litigated. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1946); Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). A judg-
ment in a particular litigation is a bar forever to that cause of action,
not only as to the issues actually presented, but also to every
justiciable issue which might have been presented. La Fontaine v. The
G. M. McAllister, 101 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Wolfson v.
Rubin, 52 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1951); Noel v. Noel, 307 Ky. 132, 210
S.W.2d 142 (1947). The dissent in the principal case also notes that
19621
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respectable authority exists to the effect that the "full faith and credit
clause will forbid one to question the jurisdiction of the court to render
a judgment in a case in which he appeared and participated as a
litigant." Citing Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Morrissey v.
Morrissey, 1 N.J. 448, 64 A.2d 209 (1949).
In conclusion, it would appear that the principal case could have
been decided on the above basis as well as on the basis that the ali-
mony under the Florida decree (if it was in fact alimony) which was
chargeable to the estate of the husband could not create a lien on the
real estate of the husband in West Virginia. However, in view of the
apparent confusion existing in the Florida courts with regard to their
position on the question of alimony existing beyond the death of the
husband, the majority opinion in the principal case seems to lack the
strength that is desired. It would appear that there are more than
merely academic questions raised by the minority opinion.
Ralph Charles Dusic, Jr.
ABSTRACTS
Afforney and Client-Liability for Title Certification
P, title insurer, sued D, a title examining attorney, for damages
sustained when various mortgages it had guaranteed as first mortgages,
in reliance on D's certification of clear title, proved to be subordinate
to other mortgages. D gave a signed certificate of personal examina-
tion when, in fact, he had relied on information obtained from an
abstract company. D argued that this was customary procedure in the
area. Federal district court entered judgment for the insurer. Held,
affirmed, and case remanded for redetermination of damages. An
attorney cannot be absolved of responsibility on the basis of custom.
Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co., 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1962).
An attorney employed to examine the title to real property must
exercise reasonable care and skill and the failure to do so is negli-
gence. Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1389 (1920). The attorney is not a guaran-
tor. He merely undertakes to bring reasonable skill and diligence
to the discharge of his duty, and he is not liable for errors of judg-
ment or for mistakes on doubtful questions of law. 5 AM. JUR. A ttor-
neys at Law § 132 (1936).
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